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SUBJECT: EUR/DAS BRADTKE'S SECURITY CONSULTATIONS WITH EU

Classified By: USEU External Affairs Officer Andrew Erickson
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY

1. (C) EUR/DAS Bradtke met May 26 in Brussels with EU leaders in the PSC Troika Format including representatives of the EU presidency, Council, and Commission. Bradtke and his EU interlocutors reviewed ESDP/NATO developments, including the BiH SFOR transition, the EU's planning for a civ-mil cell, EU African peacekeeping ambitions, the development of NRF and the EU's rapid response capabilities, including battlegroups, and finally, ways of moving forward with NATO-EU strategic cooperation after enlargement in both organizations. The EU believes that preparations for a post-SFOR EU presence in Bosnia are proceeding well. The EU also reviewed its non-pro efforts and views on Afghanistan; Bradtke briefed on Kosovo and heard a read-out of the last EUROMED meeting. Finally, Bradtke reviewed with EU interlocutors the state of play in Moldova. In a separate meeting, Bradtke met with HiRep Solana at Solana's request to hear a strong pitch for a more creative approach by NATO to Partnership for peace for Bosnia. Solana also stressed his desire for the EU to be more active in Kosovo. End summary.

Solana/Cooper Meetings

2. (C) At the Hirep's request, Bradtke met privately with Solana for half an hour prior to the larger consultative meeting with the EU Presidency, Council, and Commission. DG Robert Cooper told Bradtke Solana was "keen" on Peter Feith to succeed Holkeri in Kosovo. Solana wanted the EU to get "their man" in UNMIK because they believe the EU will eventually take a lead role in Kosovo. Solana, who joined the meeting later, did not make a pitch directly for Feith, but urged a quick decision on a replacement for Holkeri in Kosovo. Cautioning that he did not want to give the impression the EU seeks to push the US out, Solana also argued for the long-term "Europeanization" of the international effort in Kosovo. He suggested the appointment of an EU insider to replace Holkeri as the first step toward creating a dual-hatted figure similar to the role played by Paddy Ashdown in Bosnia.

3. (C) Bradtke told Cooper that the US was well aware of Feith's strong qualifications. While this was a European decision, there was concern about Feith's key role in managing the Berlin Plus transition in Bosnia. Cooper recognized this as a problem, and suggested that if Holkeri stayed on through his tenure to August, much of the heavy lifting on Bosnia should be completed. Solana said the international community should stick with its focus on standards through mid-2005, but that Kosovo was facing a difficult period with elections on the way. He was pleased with the new US-EU-NATO formula, but noted that Kostunica preferred the Contact Group because he could use Russia's presence to gain leverage. That said, Solana said in his recent discussions with the Russians (including Putin), he found Moscow open to new ideas, and prepared to be constructive. After the meeting, Cooper approached Bradtke and suggested that one option was that Declan Kelleher, the Irish PSC ambassador, would replace Feith on Solana's staff. The other option was that he (Cooper) would try to take on more responsibility for the day-to-day management of the Bosnia transition.

Bosnia and PfP

4. (C) Solana noted that the Bosnian PM had spoken to the NAC/PSC at the beginning of the week, and had made a strong case for his country's commitment to reform. Solana suggested that, while mindful that it was not for him to give advice to NATO, it might be time for NATO to rethink the linkage between PfP and PIFWCs, noting that PfP is a powerful tool to provide "oxygen" to militaries that enable them to act more responsibly, which in turn is more likely to have a positive impact on efforts to apprehend PIFWCs than the current approach. The linkage is leading to frustration, and it might be time to be more creative, rather than remain

"trapped" in the current policy. Bradtke responded that the US had reviewed this issue at senior levels, and was not not prepared to change the current policy before the Istanbul Summit.

BiH SFOR Transition

15. (C) Following his meetings with Solana and Cooper, Bradtke met with the PSC Troika formation of Presidency state Ireland, incoming presidency state the Netherlands, EU Council Secretariat and Commission staff. The Presidency chaired, with Irish PSC Ambassador Declan Kelleher opening by noting that NATO-EU cooperation on Bosnia was moving ahead smartly. The EUMS is staffing its liaison positions at SHAPE, and will soon send a liaison to Naples. PSC ambassadors will visit Naples in early June to educate themselves about the role of CINCSOUTH. The EU informal force generation conference will take place June 8th; modalities for third country participation remain under discussion. The EU remains concerned about the need for clear delineation of tasks, a clear Dayton mandate for the EU, and ensuring "access to reserves at all levels." Bradtke responded that the US was generally satisfied with the EU's general concept for Bosnia, and pleased with Pieter Feith's good cooperation with the NATO IS. Nonetheless, the US was committed to the need for both NATO and the EU to have full access to all Dayton authorities, with Bradtke saying: "Dayton gave NATO very broad authority in Bosnia; we don't want an effort to pick apart Annex 1A."

16. (C) Dutch PSC Ambassador Hamer told Bradtke "what you have described is in line with our thoughts." Council ESDP Deputy Director General Feith noted that the debate on delineation and mandate is on-going at NATO; the key is to "avoid the possibility of Bosnians using NATO as an appeals court if EU assesses non-compliance on an issue." Feith added that the delineation remains a political point that can't be left to authorities on the ground; the EU "needs to be fully comfortable with delineation." This delineation need not be formally endorsed by the NAC-PSC, Bradtke agreed with Feith. Finally, Bradtke underscored that a NAC decision would be required to endorse EU access to strategic reserves.

EU Civ-Mil Cell

17. (C) Kelleher noted that the EU cell "is not a standing HQ"; it is part of a package with the EU cell at SHAPE, and should be seen as such. It will have three main functions, developing strategic options, assisting NHQs, and working EU autonomous operations without recourse to NATO assets. The cell will have approximately 25 personnel, and will keep DSACEUR informed through consultations. HRSO Solana's goal is to have a political way forward agreed by June; it will be up to the Dutch presidency (second half of 2004) to move the concept "from words to work" e.g. implementation and staffing of the cell. Feith added that he believed the cell would be up and running by "late 2005 or the beginning of 2006." Bradtke noted that Washington continues to follow the development of the cell with close interest and appreciates the assurances the U.S. has received regarding its consistency with Berlin-plus and non-duplication of NATO capabilities.

EU Ambition
for Africa?

18. (C) Although the EU is currently not actively involved in peacekeeping in Africa, it anticipates a surge in demand for African peacekeeping, according to Kelleher. The EU's approach will be multilateral, focusing on close cooperation with the African Union and other regional actors. It will also be, in keeping with EU doctrine: "integrated" -- meaning that it will involve all EU actors, civilian & military, for a coordinated approach to security restoration. For now, the EU's ambitions are greater than its actions: one EU military staff liaison officer is in Addis Ababa to liaise with the African Union. He is there now. The EU also has on line its 250 million euro African peacekeeping facility, which it has yet to use.

EU battlegroups

19. (C) Following Bradtke's review of developments with the NATO Rapid Reaction Force (NRF), the EU briefed on its battlegroups (BG) concept, based upon the UK-FR-GE proposal for national and multinational units of 1500 troops deployable within fifteen days. The concept has been

endorsed by EU foreign ministers, and is now being fleshed out. The key point for the EU was the promotion of "mutually reinforcing" capabilities; Kelleher also warned of EU concerns that capabilities not be "frozen" by commitments to specific duties. The EU would seek -- and offer -- transparency with NATO as it developed its approach to BGs. Bradtke probed for specifics on how the BG concept would work. It was clear that EU interlocutors had few. The Council military planner speculated that "sub-Saharan Africa would probably be about the limit" of potential deployability.

110. (C) Bradtke underscored the need to keep NATO and EU standards aligned. In response to Bradtke's question about whether the EU would conduct field exercises for its BGs, Ambassador Kelleher underscored that the EU would not conduct field exercises, below the force headquarters level. Training remains a national responsibility. Keller also assured Bradtke that participation in battlegroups would be open to all EU members, rather than only to members meeting certain criteria.

Post Enlargement
NATO-EU relations

111. (C) Bradtke observed that it was important to ensure that enlargement not hinder NATO - EU cooperation, despite the challenges posed on participation by the accession of Cyprus and Malta, both non-PfP members. Ambassador Kelleher replied that the EU's position on participation was that the use of NATO classified information -- or information derived from NATO classified information -- was the dividing line for the EU in terms of whether Cyprus and Malta would participate in EU consultations with NATO. While the classification exclusion was certain, it also could reduce their rights as full EU member states. Kelleher probed Bradtke about the prospect of a NATO - EU summit, or ministerial, on the margins of the NATO Istanbul Summit. Bradtke said that from his perspective, the issue of Malta and Cyprus did not preclude holding NATO-EU Summits or Ministerials with the participation of all twenty-five EU members. However, at Istanbul, the US opposed a summit and probably would not be enthusiastic about a ministerial, because of the time constraints. Changing the subject, Bradtke praised the Netherlands/UK/LUX non-paper on prospective enhanced NATO-EU cooperation; "let's operationalize it," he said.

Kosovo

112. (C) Bradtke agreed with the EU on the need to redouble efforts to address Kosovo; the US and the EU agreed that there could be no reward for the recent violence. Instead, the work of the contact group and US-NATO-EU efforts on an intensive dialogue, including Belgrade Serbs needed to be advanced more rapidly. Standards before status remained the operative vision of both the EU and the US; there was a need for a good replacement for UNMIK chief Holkeri, and there were a number of excellent European candidates under consideration.

Other Issues: Non-Pro,
EuroMed, Afghanistan &
and Moldova

113. (C) Kelleher briefly reviewed recent EU actions aimed at strengthening non-proliferation cooperation; Bradtke responded that the US was pleased with EU efforts, and looked forward to further cooperation. In this regard, the US was looking forward to seeing the EU draft for the US-EU Summit Declaration. On other issues, Kelleher, Council, and Commission officials made the following points:

-- On Afghanistan, the Commission has set a demobilization goal of 40,000. The Commission is in the midst of an internal debate about how to manage observing the elections; clearly "a normal observation mission is impossible." The EU will most likely seek a solution dependent upon heavy use of NGOs and human rights advocacy groups. Bradtke briefed on the status of PRTs, and the critical need for countries to fulfill their assistance and security pledges with actual disbursements. The EU asked for an assessment of the impact of the withdrawal of Russian border grounds from Tadjikistan; Bradtke replied that there was a need to address border security, but that the Russian record there had not been a good one.

-- On the EUROMED dialogue, Kelleher noted that the most recent EUROMED meeting had been an informal one; the next formal meeting of the partners would be held during the Luxembourg presidency in the first half of 2005. This informal was the first EUROMED meeting at 25 (the new

accession states) plus the ten EUROMED partners; Libya attended as a guest. There were two significant results. The first was the decision to make Alexandria the seat of the EUROMED foundation; this would enhance Israeli-Arab as well as European-Arab dialogue and intercourse. The second outcome was a general agreement that at 35, a new working method needed to be conceived for EUROMED; this was being explored, but would result in a more efficient mechanism. In an "unplanned" Troika with the Libyan FM, the EU expressed its strong dissatisfaction with the death sentences for the Bulgarian medics. Bradtke thanked the EU for the update, and noted that US GME efforts were not intended to supplant EU efforts in the region, but rather to further dialogue among the parties.

-- Finally, Bradtke and the EU briefly exchanged views on Moldova, with both sides agreeing that progress is stalled, and that the Russians must be held to their commitments.

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